--- /dev/null
+<?php
+/**
+ * Functions for dealing with OpenID trust roots
+ *
+ * PHP versions 4 and 5
+ *
+ * LICENSE: See the COPYING file included in this distribution.
+ *
+ * @package OpenID
+ * @author JanRain, Inc. <openid@janrain.com>
+ * @copyright 2005-2008 Janrain, Inc.
+ * @license http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 Apache
+ */
+
+require_once 'Auth/OpenID/Discover.php';
+
+/**
+ * A regular expression that matches a domain ending in a top-level domains.
+ * Used in checking trust roots for sanity.
+ *
+ * @access private
+ */
+define('Auth_OpenID___TLDs',
+ '/\.(ac|ad|ae|aero|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|arpa|as|asia' .
+ '|at|au|aw|ax|az|ba|bb|bd|be|bf|bg|bh|bi|biz|bj|bm|bn|bo|br' .
+ '|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cat|cc|cd|cf|cg|ch|ci|ck|cl|cm|cn|co' .
+ '|com|coop|cr|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|edu|ee|eg' .
+ '|er|es|et|eu|fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gb|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl' .
+ '|gm|gn|gov|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie' .
+ '|il|im|in|info|int|io|iq|ir|is|it|je|jm|jo|jobs|jp|ke|kg|kh' .
+ '|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly' .
+ '|ma|mc|md|me|mg|mh|mil|mk|ml|mm|mn|mo|mobi|mp|mq|mr|ms|mt' .
+ '|mu|museum|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|name|nc|ne|net|nf|ng|ni|nl|no' .
+ '|np|nr|nu|nz|om|org|pa|pe|pf|pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|pro|ps|pt' .
+ '|pw|py|qa|re|ro|rs|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|sg|sh|si|sj|sk|sl' .
+ '|sm|sn|so|sr|st|su|sv|sy|sz|tc|td|tel|tf|tg|th|tj|tk|tl|tm' .
+ '|tn|to|tp|tr|travel|tt|tv|tw|tz|ua|ug|uk|us|uy|uz|va|vc|ve' .
+ '|vg|vi|vn|vu|wf|ws|xn--0zwm56d|xn--11b5bs3a9aj6g' .
+ '|xn--80akhbyknj4f|xn--9t4b11yi5a|xn--deba0ad|xn--g6w251d' .
+ '|xn--hgbk6aj7f53bba|xn--hlcj6aya9esc7a|xn--jxalpdlp' .
+ '|xn--kgbechtv|xn--zckzah|ye|yt|yu|za|zm|zw)\.?$/');
+
+define('Auth_OpenID___HostSegmentRe',
+ "/^(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9!$&'\\(\\)\\*+,;=._~]|%[a-zA-Z0-9]{2})*$/");
+
+/**
+ * A wrapper for trust-root related functions
+ */
+class Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot {
+ /*
+ * Return a discovery URL for this realm.
+ *
+ * Return null if the realm could not be parsed or was not valid.
+ *
+ * @param return_to The relying party return URL of the OpenID
+ * authentication request
+ *
+ * @return The URL upon which relying party discovery should be
+ * run in order to verify the return_to URL
+ */
+ function buildDiscoveryURL($realm)
+ {
+ $parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($realm);
+
+ if ($parsed === false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if ($parsed['wildcard']) {
+ // Use "www." in place of the star
+ if ($parsed['host'][0] != '.') {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $www_domain = 'www' . $parsed['host'];
+
+ return sprintf('%s://%s%s', $parsed['scheme'],
+ $www_domain, $parsed['path']);
+ } else {
+ return $parsed['unparsed'];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Parse a URL into its trust_root parts.
+ *
+ * @static
+ *
+ * @access private
+ *
+ * @param string $trust_root The url to parse
+ *
+ * @return mixed $parsed Either an associative array of trust root
+ * parts or false if parsing failed.
+ */
+ function _parse($trust_root)
+ {
+ $trust_root = Auth_OpenID_urinorm($trust_root);
+ if ($trust_root === null) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (preg_match("/:\/\/[^:]+(:\d+){2,}(\/|$)/", $trust_root)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $parts = @parse_url($trust_root);
+ if ($parts === false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $required_parts = array('scheme', 'host');
+ $forbidden_parts = array('user', 'pass', 'fragment');
+ $keys = array_keys($parts);
+ if (array_intersect($keys, $required_parts) != $required_parts) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (array_intersect($keys, $forbidden_parts) != array()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!preg_match(Auth_OpenID___HostSegmentRe, $parts['host'])) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $scheme = strtolower($parts['scheme']);
+ $allowed_schemes = array('http', 'https');
+ if (!in_array($scheme, $allowed_schemes)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ $parts['scheme'] = $scheme;
+
+ $host = strtolower($parts['host']);
+ $hostparts = explode('*', $host);
+ switch (count($hostparts)) {
+ case 1:
+ $parts['wildcard'] = false;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if ($hostparts[0] ||
+ ($hostparts[1] && substr($hostparts[1], 0, 1) != '.')) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ $host = $hostparts[1];
+ $parts['wildcard'] = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (strpos($host, ':') !== false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $parts['host'] = $host;
+
+ if (isset($parts['path'])) {
+ $path = strtolower($parts['path']);
+ if (substr($path, 0, 1) != '/') {
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ $path = '/';
+ }
+
+ $parts['path'] = $path;
+ if (!isset($parts['port'])) {
+ $parts['port'] = false;
+ }
+
+
+ $parts['unparsed'] = $trust_root;
+
+ return $parts;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Is this trust root sane?
+ *
+ * A trust root is sane if it is syntactically valid and it has a
+ * reasonable domain name. Specifically, the domain name must be
+ * more than one level below a standard TLD or more than two
+ * levels below a two-letter tld.
+ *
+ * For example, '*.com' is not a sane trust root, but '*.foo.com'
+ * is. '*.co.uk' is not sane, but '*.bbc.co.uk' is.
+ *
+ * This check is not always correct, but it attempts to err on the
+ * side of marking sane trust roots insane instead of marking
+ * insane trust roots sane. For example, 'kink.fm' is marked as
+ * insane even though it "should" (for some meaning of should) be
+ * marked sane.
+ *
+ * This function should be used when creating OpenID servers to
+ * alert the users of the server when a consumer attempts to get
+ * the user to accept a suspicious trust root.
+ *
+ * @static
+ * @param string $trust_root The trust root to check
+ * @return bool $sanity Whether the trust root looks OK
+ */
+ function isSane($trust_root)
+ {
+ $parts = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root);
+ if ($parts === false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Localhost is a special case
+ if ($parts['host'] == 'localhost') {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ $host_parts = explode('.', $parts['host']);
+ if ($parts['wildcard']) {
+ // Remove the empty string from the beginning of the array
+ array_shift($host_parts);
+ }
+
+ if ($host_parts && !$host_parts[count($host_parts) - 1]) {
+ array_pop($host_parts);
+ }
+
+ if (!$host_parts) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Don't allow adjacent dots
+ if (in_array('', $host_parts, true)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Get the top-level domain of the host. If it is not a valid TLD,
+ // it's not sane.
+ preg_match(Auth_OpenID___TLDs, $parts['host'], $matches);
+ if (!$matches) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ $tld = $matches[1];
+
+ if (count($host_parts) == 1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if ($parts['wildcard']) {
+ // It's a 2-letter tld with a short second to last segment
+ // so there needs to be more than two segments specified
+ // (e.g. *.co.uk is insane)
+ $second_level = $host_parts[count($host_parts) - 2];
+ if (strlen($tld) == 2 && strlen($second_level) <= 3) {
+ return count($host_parts) > 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Does this URL match the given trust root?
+ *
+ * Return whether the URL falls under the given trust root. This
+ * does not check whether the trust root is sane. If the URL or
+ * trust root do not parse, this function will return false.
+ *
+ * @param string $trust_root The trust root to match against
+ *
+ * @param string $url The URL to check
+ *
+ * @return bool $matches Whether the URL matches against the
+ * trust root
+ */
+ function match($trust_root, $url)
+ {
+ $trust_root_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root);
+ $url_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($url);
+ if (!$trust_root_parsed || !$url_parsed) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Check hosts matching
+ if ($url_parsed['wildcard']) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if ($trust_root_parsed['wildcard']) {
+ $host_tail = $trust_root_parsed['host'];
+ $host = $url_parsed['host'];
+ if ($host_tail &&
+ substr($host, -(strlen($host_tail))) != $host_tail &&
+ substr($host_tail, 1) != $host) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ($trust_root_parsed['host'] != $url_parsed['host']) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check path and query matching
+ $base_path = $trust_root_parsed['path'];
+ $path = $url_parsed['path'];
+ if (!isset($trust_root_parsed['query'])) {
+ if ($base_path != $path) {
+ if (substr($path, 0, strlen($base_path)) != $base_path) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (substr($base_path, strlen($base_path) - 1, 1) != '/' &&
+ substr($path, strlen($base_path), 1) != '/') {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ $base_query = $trust_root_parsed['query'];
+ $query = @$url_parsed['query'];
+ $qplus = substr($query, 0, strlen($base_query) + 1);
+ $bqplus = $base_query . '&';
+ if ($base_path != $path ||
+ ($base_query != $query && $qplus != $bqplus)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // The port and scheme need to match exactly
+ return ($trust_root_parsed['scheme'] == $url_parsed['scheme'] &&
+ $url_parsed['port'] === $trust_root_parsed['port']);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the endpoint is a relying party OpenID return_to endpoint,
+ * return the endpoint URL. Otherwise, return None.
+ *
+ * This function is intended to be used as a filter for the Yadis
+ * filtering interface.
+ *
+ * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.services}}
+ * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.filters}}
+ *
+ * @param endpoint: An XRDS BasicServiceEndpoint, as returned by
+ * performing Yadis dicovery.
+ *
+ * @returns: The endpoint URL or None if the endpoint is not a
+ * relying party endpoint.
+ */
+function filter_extractReturnURL(&$endpoint)
+{
+ if ($endpoint->matchTypes(array(Auth_OpenID_RP_RETURN_TO_URL_TYPE))) {
+ return $endpoint;
+ } else {
+ return null;
+ }
+}
+
+function &Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL(&$endpoint_list)
+{
+ $result = array();
+
+ foreach ($endpoint_list as $endpoint) {
+ if (filter_extractReturnURL($endpoint)) {
+ $result[] = $endpoint;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is the return_to URL under one of the supplied allowed return_to
+ * URLs?
+ */
+function Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowed_return_to_urls, $return_to)
+{
+ foreach ($allowed_return_to_urls as $allowed_return_to) {
+ // A return_to pattern works the same as a realm, except that
+ // it's not allowed to use a wildcard. We'll model this by
+ // parsing it as a realm, and not trying to match it if it has
+ // a wildcard.
+
+ $return_realm = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($allowed_return_to);
+ if (// Parses as a trust root
+ ($return_realm !== false) &&
+ // Does not have a wildcard
+ (!$return_realm['wildcard']) &&
+ // Matches the return_to that we passed in with it
+ (Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::match($allowed_return_to, $return_to))) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // No URL in the list matched
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a relying party discovery URL return a list of return_to
+ * URLs.
+ */
+function Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs($relying_party_url, &$fetcher,
+ $discover_function=null)
+{
+ if ($discover_function === null) {
+ $discover_function = array('Auth_Yadis_Yadis', 'discover');
+ }
+
+ $xrds_parse_cb = array('Auth_OpenID_ServiceEndpoint', 'fromXRDS');
+
+ list($rp_url_after_redirects, $endpoints) =
+ Auth_Yadis_getServiceEndpoints($relying_party_url, $xrds_parse_cb,
+ $discover_function, $fetcher);
+
+ if ($rp_url_after_redirects != $relying_party_url) {
+ // Verification caused a redirect
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ call_user_func_array($discover_function,
+ array($relying_party_url, $fetcher));
+
+ $return_to_urls = array();
+ $matching_endpoints = Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL($endpoints);
+
+ foreach ($matching_endpoints as $e) {
+ $return_to_urls[] = $e->server_url;
+ }
+
+ return $return_to_urls;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that a return_to URL is valid for the given realm.
+ *
+ * This function builds a discovery URL, performs Yadis discovery on
+ * it, makes sure that the URL does not redirect, parses out the
+ * return_to URLs, and finally checks to see if the current return_to
+ * URL matches the return_to.
+ *
+ * @return true if the return_to URL is valid for the realm
+ */
+function Auth_OpenID_verifyReturnTo($realm_str, $return_to, &$fetcher,
+ $_vrfy='Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs')
+{
+ $disco_url = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::buildDiscoveryURL($realm_str);
+
+ if ($disco_url === false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $allowable_urls = call_user_func_array($_vrfy,
+ array($disco_url, &$fetcher));
+
+ // The realm_str could not be parsed.
+ if ($allowable_urls === false) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowable_urls, $return_to)) {
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+?>
\ No newline at end of file
projects / quix0rs-gnu-social.git / blobdiff